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WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center
ADMINISTRATIVE PANEL DECISION
Interstate National Dealer Services, Inc. v. Selwyn Colley
Case No. D2004-0934
1. The Parties
The Complainant is Interstate National Dealer Services, Inc., New York, New York, United States of America, represented by Bryan Cave, LLP, United States of America.
The Respondent is Selwyn Colley, Lake Barrington, Illinois, United States of America.
2. The Domain Names and Registrars
The disputed domain names <carwarrantiesdirect.com> and <carwarrantiesdirect.net> are registered with Network Solutions, LLC.
3. Procedural History
The Complaint was filed with the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center (the "Center") on November 24, 2003. On November 25, 2003, the Center transmitted by e-mail to Network Solutions, LLC, a request for registrar verification in connection with the domain names at issue. On December 3, 2003, Network Solutions, LLC, transmitted by e-mail to the Center its verification response confirming that the Respondent is listed as the registrant and providing the contact details for the administrative and technical contact. In response to a notification by the Center that the Complaint was administratively deficient, the Complainant filed an amendment to the Complaint on December 16, 2003. The Center verified that the Complaint together with the amendment to the Complaint satisfied the formal requirements of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Policy"), the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules"), and the WIPO Supplemental Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Supplemental Rules").
In accordance with the Rules, paragraphs 2(a) and 4(a), the Center formally notified the Respondent of the Complaint, and the proceedings commenced on January 6, 2004. In accordance with the Rules, paragraph 5(a), the due date for Response was January 26, 2004. The Respondent did not submit any response. Accordingly, the Center notified the Respondent of the Respondent’s default on January 29, 2004.
Although Respondent did not submit a response, on November 27, 2003, Respondent sent an e-mail message to the Center asking that the dispute be directed to "Extended Auto Warranty Corp/Warranty Administrators" asserting the reason that "[t]hey have taken over the business and we have notified Network Solutions of this and are awaiting transfer. They took over the domain name as of May 1st. We have not conducted any business since."
On February 10, 2004, "The Ultimate Warranty Corporation" submitted a response to Complainant’s Complaint, asserting that The Ultimate Warranty Corporation owned the disputed domain names.
The Center appointed Bradley A. Slutsky as the Sole Panelist in this matter on February 11, 2004. The Panel finds that it was properly constituted. The Panel has submitted the Statement of Acceptance and Declaration of Impartiality and Independence, as required by the Center to ensure compliance with the Rules, paragraph 7.
On February 5, 2004, Complainant sent an e-mail message to the Center moving to strike the response of The Ultimate Warranty Corporation or, in the alternative, for leave to file a reply.
On February 25, 2004, the Panel issued Administrative Order No. 1, denying Complainant’s motion to strike the response of The Ultimate Warranty Corporation, granting Complainant’s motion for leave to file a reply, and notifying the parties that, based on the evidence submitted through February 25, 2004, the Panel believed Selwyn Colley was the proper Respondent.
Complainant then submitted a reply memorandum dated March 4, 2004, and The Ultimate Warranty Corporation submitted an Affidavit of James Clark also dated March 4, 2004.
4. Factual Background
Complainant owns the incontestable registered trademark WARRANTY DIRECT for "providing service contracts and extended warranty contracts" for various types of vehicles, appliances, and equipment, including "new and used motor vehicles." The registration issued on May 6, 1997, and claims a date of first use of September 1, 1995.
Respondent registered the disputed domain names <carwarrantiesdirect.com> and <carwarrantiesdirect.net> on August 4, 2000, and used them on a website that offered, among other things, extended auto warranties.
On November 21, 2002, Complainant wrote to Respondent and requested that Respondent cease and desist from any further use of the disputed domain names. On December 6, 2002, Respondent responded to this letter stating, among other things, that "[w]e did not know that there was any copyright on the name Warranty Direct or Warranties Direct." On January 24, 2003, Complainant’s counsel wrote to Respondent, provided a copy of Complainant’s certificate of trademark registration, and again demanded that Respondent cease and desist using the disputed domain names. On March 28, 2003, Respondent’s counsel wrote to Complainant’s counsel, alleged that there is no likelihood of confusion between the disputed domain names and Complainant’s mark, and proposed that Complainant offer to pay Respondent "the costs of changing its name and the amounts spent on advertising." On May 19, 2003, Respondent wrote to Complainant’s attorney and stated that "the business of [Car Warranties Direct LLC] as well as the website has been taken over by Warranty Administrators … as of the May 1, 2003." The Ultimate Warranty Corporation attached to its response a document dated May 15, 2003, and entitled "Sale Of Business Assets" which transfers to The Ultimate Warranty Corporation "[a]ll right title, and interest in and to [Car Warranties Direct, LLC’s] website located at ‘carwarrantiesdirect.com’ subject however to the terms of Paragraph 6(c)." Paragraph 6(c) provides that The Ultimate Warranty Corporation "shall … [c]hange the domain name of the website currently operated and owned by [Car Warranties Direct, LLC]." On May 20, 2003, Complainant sent a cease and desist letter to Warranty Administrators. Through a conversation with counsel for The Ultimate Warranty Corporation as well as through the investigation of Marksmen®, Complainant understood that The Ultimate Warranty Corporation would be changing the name of the Car Warranties Direct business. On October 3, 2003, however, counsel for The Ultimate Warranty Corporation wrote to counsel for Complainant and stated that The Ultimate Warranty Corporation "has expended significant funds toward the updating of its website and the registration of the URL in connection with internet search engines and does not wish to change the domain name at this time." Complainant then brought this proceeding.
5. Parties’ Contentions
Complainant asserts that it has prior rights in an incontestable trademark,
and that Respondent seeks to capitalize on Complainant’s goodwill by adding
the generic word "car" to Complainant’s trademark and making Complainant’s
trademark plural. Complainant asserts that the disputed domain names thus are
confusingly similar to Complainant’s mark. Complainant asserts that Respondent
has no legitimate interests in the disputed domain names because Complainant
has priority of use and because The Ultimate Warranty Corporation allegedly
had written notice of Complainant’s rights prior to allegedly purchasing the
disputed domain names (although in its reply Complainant argues that The Ultimate
Warranty Corporation does not own the disputed domain names). Complainant alleges
that Respondent and The Ultimate Warranty Corporation provide identical and
competitive extended car warranty services to those of Complainant, and that
the use of the disputed domain names diverts consumers from Complainant’s website.
Complainant points to decisions holding that "an infringing use is not
a bona fide offering of goods or services under the policy,"
and argues that Respondent’s use falls within this precept. Complainant further
argues that Respondent’s adoption of domain names confusingly similar to incontestable
registered trademarks, and use of the domain names to offer the same types of
services, shows a clear intent to create a likelihood of confusion, dilute and
tarnish Complainant’s mark, and attract, for commercial gain, Internet users
to Respondent’s website by creating initial interest confusion. Complainant
points to e-mail correspondence allegedly demonstrating a single instance of
actual confusion, and points to Google™ search results for "car warranties
direct" and "car warranty direct" which list Respondent’s site
first, arguing that this is further evidence of likelihood of confusion.
The Respondent did not reply to the Complainant’s contentions. However, The
Ultimate Warranty Corporation’s response argues that "Ultimate’s use of
its domain name is fair, not misleading, and is not intended to either divert
consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark of any competitor."
The Ultimate Warranty Corporation argues in essence that its use of the disputed
domain names is intended to convey, in a generic sense, the fact that consumers
can obtain car warranties direct from The Ultimate Warranty Corporation. The
Ultimate Warranty Corporation points to case law outlining the factors for determining
whether there is a likelihood of confusion (e.g., strength of mark, relatedness
of goods/services, similarity of marks, evidence of actual confusion, marketing
channels, likely degree of purchaser care, defendant’s intent in selecting their
mark, and likelihood of expansion of product lines), and argues that there is
little evidence demonstrating that any "relevant consumer" has been
misled or confused. The Ultimate Warranty Corporation also argues that Complainant’s
mark is not distinctive, is at best descriptive, and is generic. Finally, The
Ultimate Warranty Corporation argues that there is no evidence The Ultimate
Warranty Corporation registered or used the disputed domain names in bad faith,
and that the parties’ websites are dissimilar.
6. Discussion and Findings
Pursuant to paragraph 15 of the Rules, panelists in domain name disputes
"shall decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents
submitted and in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles
of law that [they] deem applicable."
Under paragraph 4(a) of the Policy, the Complainant must prove the following:
(i) Respondent’s domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark
or service mark in which the Complainant has rights; and
(ii) Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain
(iii) Respondent’s domain name has been registered and is being used in bad
A. Identical or Confusingly Similar
Under paragraph 4(a)(i) of the Policy the Complainant must show that the
domain names at issue are "identical or confusingly similar to a trademark
or service mark in which the complainant has rights." Numerous Panels have
held that the addition of a generic word to a trademark and/or the use of a
plural form of a trademark do not adequately distinguish a domain name from
an otherwise identical or confusingly similar trademark. See, e.g., Toyota
Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha d/b/a Toyota Motor Corporation v. S&S Enterprises
Ltd., WIPO Case No. D2000-0802 (September 9, 2000)
("Neither the generic prefix ‘I’ (for ‘internet’) nor the suffix ‘.com’
nor (in the case of the domain name <itoyotas.com>) the plural suffix
‘s’ detract from the overall impression of the dominant part of the name in
each case, namely the well known trademark TOYOTA, instantly recognizable around
the world as denoting the goods of the complainant."). On the facts of
this case, the Panel finds that the disputed domain names are confusingly similar
to Complainant’s mark.
Any argument that Complainant’s trademark is generic is rejected. Complainant’s
trademark is incontestable and the registration for the mark, which is attached
to Complainant’s Complaint, "shall be conclusive evidence of the validity
of the registered mark and of the registration of the mark, of the registrant’s
ownership of the mark, and of the registrant’s exclusive right to use the registered
mark in commerce … on or in connection with the goods or services specified
in the" Section 15 affidavit. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b).
B. Rights or Legitimate Interests
The Complainant also must demonstrate that the Respondent has "no rights
or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name." Paragraph 4(a)(ii)
of the Policy.
Complainant has shown that the parties are in the same line of business and
that, according to Respondent’s website, Respondent has "over 20 years
of experience in the AUTO industry." Complainant also has shown that it
has an incontestable registered trademark, with a date of first use approximately
five years prior to Respondent’s registration of the disputed domain names.
Under 15 U.S.C. § 1072, Complainant’s "[r]egistration of [the] mark on
the principal register … shall be constructive notice of the registrant’s claim
of ownership thereof." See also Marconi Data Systems, Inc. v. IRG Coins
and Ink Source, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2000-0090
(April 11, 2000). A corollary of this rule, adopted by some Panels,
is that under certain circumstances the Respondent has a duty to conduct a search
to be sure the trade name it is adopting does not infringe a registered mark.
See, e.g., Marketing Mix, Inc. v. Mix, WIPO
Case No. D2000-0352 (July 3, 2000); Inter-IKEA Systems B.V.
v. McLaughlin Mobility, WIPO Case No.
D2000-0499 (August 1, 2000). In this case, for example, Respondent
agreed and warranted in Respondent’s Service Agreement with its registrar that
"neither [Respondent’s] registration nor use of any of the VeriSign services
nor the manner in which [Respondent] intend[ed] to use such VeriSign services
will directly or indirectly infringe the legal rights of a third party."
In the words of one Panel, "[i]f the warranty to the Registrar is to be
regarded as anything other than reckless (i.e. made without caring whether it
be true or false) then a registrant should take some reasonable steps to satisfy
him/herself that the warranty is true. For example, an on-line search of the
U.S. Patent Register might not be an unreasonable precaution for a US registrant
to take before attempting a .BIZ registration." MGM Mirage & the
Primadonna Company, LLC v. Young Joon Choi, Case
No. DBIZ2001-00036 (February 14, 2002).
However, "[a]ny of the following circumstances, in particular but without
limitation, if found by the Panel to be proved based on its evaluation of all
evidence presented, shall demonstrate [the Respondent’s] rights or legitimate
interests to the domain name for purposes of Paragraph 4(a)(ii)":
(i) before any notice to [Respondent] of the dispute, [Respondent’s] use of,
or demonstrable preparations to use, the domain name or a name corresponding
to the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods
or services; or
(ii) [Respondent] (as an individual, business, or other organization) ha[s]
been commonly known by the domain name, even if [Respondent has] acquired no
trademark or service mark rights; or
(iii) [Respondent is] making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the
domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers
or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue.
Paragraph 4(c) of the Policy.
The evidence in this regard consists of a letter from Respondent to Complainant,
dated December 6, 2002, stating that "[w]e adopted Car Warranties
Direct to identify our business because we wanted our prospective customers
and customers to know what was our product from our name. We did not know that
there was any copyright on the name Warranty Direct or Warranties Direct."
Further, a simple search of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s Trademark
Electronic Search System does not reveal Complainant’s trademark when searching
for "car warranties direct," "car warranty direct," "car
warranties," "car warranty," or several other variations (though
a search for "warranty direct" or "warranties direct" would
uncover Complainant’s trademark as, presumably, would a search from a search
firm such as Thomson & Thomson).
When Respondent is engaged in the commercial sale of competitive products,
Respondent cannot take advantage of the rights or legitimate interests defenses
of paragraph 4(c)(i) or (iii) of the Policy by relying on uses that are
infringing, because such uses are not considered "bona fide"
or "legitimate" or "fair use." CEC Entertainment, Inc.
v. Momm Amed Ia, NAF Case No. FA0009000095740 (October 30, 2000);
AltaVista Company v. James A. Maggs, NAF Case No. FA0008000095545 (October 24, 2000);
Guerlain S.A. v. Peikang, WIPO Case
No. D2000-0055 (March 21, 2000).
In order to determine whether Respondent’s subsequent use of a confusingly
similar trademark is infringing, the Panel must examine the likelihood of confusion
factors such as those cited in the Response (i.e., strength of mark, relatedness
of goods/services, similarity of marks, evidence of actual confusion, marketing
channels, likely degree of purchaser care, defendant’s intent in selecting their
mark, and likelihood of expansion of product lines). See, e.g., Interactive
Products Corp. v. A2Z Mobile Office Solutions, Inc., 326 F.3d 687,
694 (6th Cir. 2003). On the evidence presented in this proceeding:
the strength of the mark factor favors Respondent, as the mark does not appear
to be strong; the relatedness of goods/services factor favors Complainant; the
similarity factor favors Complainant; the actual confusion factor favors Respondent,
as one instance of actual confusion is not sufficiently probative; the marketing
channels favors Complainant; Complainant has offered no evidence concerning
likely degree of purchaser care; the intent factor favors Respondent as there
is little evidence of intent; and the likelihood of expansion factor is not
relevant because the parties already are in the same business.
Thus, if this were an infringement case in federal court, the question of infringement
based on this record would be close - too close to say that the Complainant
has met its burden in this administrative proceeding.
The "Second Staff Report on Implementation Documents for the Uniform Dispute
Resolution Policy" notes three "fundamental observations" in
connection with the approval of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy
implementation documents. One such observation relates to the "minimalist"
nature of proceedings under the Policy, and states as follows:
"In contrast to the policy currently followed by NSI, the policy adopted
by the Board in Santiago, as set forth in the final WIPO report and recommended
by the DNSO and registrar group, calls for administrative resolution for only
a small, special class of disputes. Except in cases involving ‘abusive registrations’
made with bad-faith intent to profit commercially from others’ trademarks (e.g.,
cybersquatting and cyberpiracy), the adopted policy leaves the resolution of
disputes to the courts (or arbitrators where agreed by the parties) and calls
for registrars not to disturb a registration until those courts decide. The
adopted policy establishes a streamlined, inexpensive administrative dispute-resolution
procedure intended only for the relatively narrow class of cases of ‘abusive
registrations.’ Thus, the fact that the policy's administrative dispute-resolution
procedure does not extend to cases where a registered domain name is subject
to a legitimate dispute (and may ultimately be found to violate the challenger's
trademark) is a feature of the policy, not a flaw. The policy relegates
all ‘legitimate’ disputes - such as those where both disputants had longstanding
trademark rights in the name when it was registered as a domain name - to the
courts; only cases of abusive registrations are intended to be subject to the
streamlined administrative dispute-resolution procedure."
In light of the evidence presented in this proceeding, the Panel finds that
the Complainant has not met its burden of demonstrating "no rights or legitimate
C. Registered and Used in Bad Faith
The Complainant also bears the burden of establishing that the "domain
name has been registered and is being used in bad faith." Policy, paragraph 4(a)(iii).
As set forth in the Policy, paragraph 4(b):
the following circumstances, in particular but without limitation, if found
by the Panel to be present, shall be evidence of the registration and use of
a domain name in bad faith:
(i) circumstances indicating that [the Respondent has] registered or [the Respondent
has] acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting,
or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant who
is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant,
for valuable consideration in excess of [Respondent’s] documented out-of-pocket
costs directly related to the domain name; or
(ii) [Respondent has] registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner
of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding
domain name, provided that [Respondent has] engaged in a pattern of such conduct;
(iii) [Respondent has] registered the domain name primarily for the purpose
of disrupting the business of a competitor; or
(iv) by using the domain name, [Respondent has] intentionally attempted to
attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to [Respondent’s] website or other
on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s
mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of [Respondent’s]
website or location or of a product or service on [Respondent’s] website or
The March 28, 2003 letter from Respondent’s counsel to Complainant’s
counsel indicates that Respondent’s counsel "would be willing to recommend
to [Respondent] that they accept a financially acceptable offer" "if
[Complainant] were to offer to pay [Respondent] for the costs of changing its
name and the amounts spent on advertising." This constitutes some evidence
of an intent to sell the disputed domains for valuable consideration in excess
of Respondent’s documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain
name. Cf. The Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc., v. Hamid Reza Mohammad Pouran,
WIPO Case No. D2002-0770 (October 16, 2002)
("Such an offer for sale constitutes bad faith use according to Paragraph 4(b)(i)
of the Policy. Certainly, expenses and/or losses derived from contracts with
third parties, web-hosting services or banner agreements do not fall within
the scope of ‘documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain
name.’"). However, the disputed domain names had been registered for
more than two years before this letter was sent, and were in use for a commercial
business prior to the time this letter was sent. As a result, the evidence does
not support a finding of bad faith based on registration primarily for the purpose
of selling the domain names for an amount exceeding out-of-pocket costs.
The only evidence of a pattern in this case is the fact that two domain names
were registered. While the registration of two domain names has, in some cases,
been held to have evidenced a pattern, see, e.g., Caterpillar, Inc. v. Ivenue.com,
Inc., NAF Case No. FA010600009739 (July 18, 2001); Yahoo! Inc.
v. Syrynx, Inc. and Hugh Hamilton, WIPO
Case No. D2000-1675 (January 30, 2001); Nokia Corporation v.
Nokiagirls.com a.k.a. IBCC, WIPO Case
No. D2000-0102 (April 18, 2000), such a finding does not seem
appropriate on the facts of this case.
This leaves the factors of disrupting the business of a competitor and attracting
Internet users, for commercial gain, by creating a likelihood of confusion.
Actual knowledge of the mark is not necessary for these factors to be satisfied.
Constructive knowledge is sufficient. See, e.g., Menard Inc. dba Menards
v. ZeBo Limited, NAF Case No. FA0112000102973 (February 5, 2002);
Sony Corporation v. Times Vision, Ltd., NAF Case No. FA0009000095686
(March 9, 2001); cf. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Walsucks and Walmarket
Puerto Rico, WIPO Case No. D2000-0477
(July 20, 2000).
Complainant’s evidence of an intent to disrupt the business of a competitor
is rebutted by Respondent’s evidence that Respondent was unaware of Complainant’s
mark and adopted the disputed domain name to describe Respondent’s business.
If Complainant’s trademark were arbitrary or famous, or if Respondent had actual
knowledge of Complainant’s trademark, this factor might bear reexamination.
Cf. Goldline International, Inc. v. Gold Line, WIPO
Case No. D2000-1151 (January 4, 2001). In the absence of such
facts, the Panel does not find bad faith based on this factor.
With regard to the final factor, Complainant has demonstrated that Respondent
intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to Respondent’s
website or other on-line location. However, in light of the infringement analysis
set forth above, Complainant has not adequately (for purposes of this proceeding)
established that Respondent is creating a likelihood of confusion with Complainant’s
mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of Respondent’s
website or location or of a product or service on Respondent’s website or location.
Accordingly, Complainant has not met its burden of demonstrating bad faith.
D. The Proper Respondent
The pleadings submitted by The Ultimate Warranty Corporation assert that The
Ultimate Warranty Corporation owns the disputed domain names and suggest that
The Ultimate Warranty Corporation is the proper Respondent. The Rules define
the Respondent as "the holder of a domain-name registration against which
a complaint is initiated." The disputed domain names are registered to
The Ultimate Warranty Corporation has submitted an e-mail message from Mr. Colley,
an affidavit from Mr. Clark (a Vice-President of Warranty Administers Inc.,
a division of The Ultimate Warranty Corporation), and a contract with Car Warranties
Direct LLC, each of which it argues support the conclusion that The Ultimate
Warranty Corporation owns the disputed domain names. Mr. Clark’s affidavit
states that "Car Warranties Direct LLC, was the owner of the domain
name <carwarrantiesdirect.com>, as registered with Network Solutions,
LLC," that "[s]ince the purchase of the assets of Car Warranties Direct
LLC" Mr. Clark has spoken with representatives of Network Solutions,
LLC "for the purpose of revising and/or updating Network Solutions’ records
relating to the ownership of the <carwarrantiesdirect.com> domain name,"
and that Mr. Clark obtained Mr. Colley’s permission to do so. The e-mail
message from Mr. Colley states that Extended Auto Warranty Corp / Warranty
Administrators "took over the domain name as of May 1st."
The contract, which is dated May 15, 2003, and which is between Car
Warranties Direct LLC and The Ultimate Warranty Corporation, transfers from
Car Warranties Direct LLC to The Ultimate Warranty Corporation "[a]ll right,
title, and interest in and to [Car Warranties Direct LLC’s] website located
at <carwarrantiesdirect.com> subject however to the terms of Paragraph 6(c)."
Paragraph 6(c) states that The Ultimate Warranty Corporation "shall
… [c]hange the domain name of the website currently operated and owned by [Car
Warranties Direct LLC]."
To say the least, there is some confusion as to the ownership of at least one
of the disputed domain names. Neither the contract nor Mr. Clark’s affidavit
appears to address the disputed domain name <carwarrantiesdirect.net>.
Mr. Colley’s e-mail indicates that Extended Auto Warranty Corp / Warranty
Administrators (not The Ultimate Warranty Corporation) took over the
domain name as of May 1, 2003, but the contract is dated two weeks later.
Mr. Clark’s affidavit identifies the company as Warranty Administers Inc.
(not Warranty Administrators). The contract is between Car Warranties Direct
LLC and The Ultimate Warranty Corporation, yet the disputed domain names are
registered to Selwyn Colley. The contract purports to transfer to The Ultimate
Warranty Corporation all right, title, and interest in Car Warranties Direct LLC’s
"website located at ‘carwarrantiesdirect.com,’" but requires The Ultimate
Warranty Corporation to "[c]hange the domain name of the website,"
which has not been done.
In light of the difficulties, discussed above, with the proof submitted by
The Ultimate Warranty Corporation, the Panel finds that The Ultimate Warranty
Corporation has not made a sufficient showing to prove it is the proper Respondent.
Thus, the decision in this proceeding addresses the facts relating to Selwyn
Colley’s registration and use of the disputed domain names. As noted above,
the affidavit submitted on behalf of The Ultimate Warranty Corporation indicates
that The Ultimate Warranty Corporation has attempted to update the "ownership"
record for the <carwarrantiesdirect.com> domain name. Because the record
is not fully developed with respect to the presence or absence of rights or
legitimate interests, or bad faith, on the part of The Ultimate Warranty Corporation
and its divisions, subsidiaries, and affiliates, and because The Ultimate Warranty
Corporation is not "the holder of a domain-name registration against which
a complaint is initiated," this decision does not address the potential
future transfer of the disputed domain names.
For all the foregoing reasons, the Complainant is denied.
Bradley A. Slutsky
Dated: April 5, 2004